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h i g h l i g h t s
• Substantial destructive behavior observed in a Fragile Public Good environment.
• Destructive behavior is modulated by the specific nature of the environment.
• Equilibration towards both cooperative and sour (spiteful) relationships observed.
• Framing and subject characteristics can affect the incidence of destructive behavior.
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a b s t r a c t
Socially destructive behavior in a public good environment – like damaging public goods – is an under-
exposed phenomenon in economics. In an experiment we investigate whether such behavior can be in-
fluenced by the very nature of an environment. To that purpose we use a Fragile Public Good (FPG) game
which puts the opportunity for destructive behavior (taking) on a level playing field with constructive
behavior (contributing). We find substantial evidence of destructive decisions, sometimes leading to sour
relationships characterized by persistent hurtful behavior. While positive framing induces fewer destruc-
tive decisions, shifting the selfish Nash towards minimal taking doubles its share to more than 20%.
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Many experimental studies have investigated the development
of cooperation in a social dilemma or public good environment,
and the effect of punishment mechanisms in this context (for a
recent survey, see Chaudhuri, 2011). In the real world, however,
people can often cooperatewith or hurt one another. Relationships
may even turn sour and induce persistent destructive behavior. Re-
peated and severe conflict is a real part of human interaction. Ex-
amples are neighborhood conflicts, family feuds, or the destruction
of public property during riots. In some studies, a substantial pro-
portion of individuals engaged in the destruction of others’ earn-
ings, even when rank egalitarianism and reciprocity motives were
not present and when the destruction was costly (Zizzo, 2003; Ab-
bink and Sadrieh, 2009). To study whether destructive behavior
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0165-1765/© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.can be observed and modulated in a public good environment we
designed a ‘Fragile Public Good’ (FPG) game. A key feature of the
FPG game is that it gives as much room for destructive behavior
(taking) as for constructive behavior (contributing). More formally,
it does so by shifting both the (standard) Nash equilibrium and the
status quo – i.e., the initial allocation of tokens to the common ac-
count – to themiddle of the action space, with perfect symmetry in
the marginal cost of taking and contributing. Contrary to the rela-
tively few public good experiments that allow for an interior Nash
equilibrium (see surveys by Laury and Holt, 2008 and Saijo, 2008),
we focus on destructive actions in a repeated context where sub-
jects can identify the individual decisions of others.
This paper is related to a developing stream of literature
on ‘feuds’ (Nikiforakis and Engelmann, 2011; Nikiforakis et al.,
2012) and ‘vendettas’ (Fehl et al., 2012; Abbink and Herrmann,
2009; Bolle et al., forthcoming). These experiments typically focus
strongly on the punishment by explicitly separating contribution
and punishment stages. For example, Nikiforakis and Engelmann
(2011) use separate punishment rounds after a 4-player public
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Average contributions.
SYM FRAME ASYM
Overall 2.28 (2.01) 2.07 (1.69) 1.83 (3.3)
First round 1.26 (2.55) −0.02 (2.55) 0.92 (3.06)
Rounds 26–34 2.44 (2.35) 2.49 (3.85) 2.13 (3.85)
Last round (35) 0.68 (2.43) 0.98 (1.81) 0.31 (3.81)
Note: adjusted for the (standard) Nash equilibrium; standard deviation in
parentheses, with dyad averages as separate observations.
good game,whereas Bolle et al. (forthcoming) let subjects decrease
others’ probabilities of winning a prize.
Because framing can influence behavior in public good games
(Brewer and Kramer, 1986; Sonnemans et al., 1998; Willinger and
Ziegelmeyer, 1999; for a survey, see Cookson, 2000), we study the
sensitivity of our findings in two additional treatments, where we
separate the status quo from the Nash outcome. In one case, we
move the status quo to a corner so that subjects can only con-
tribute, keeping everything else the same; this is a case of posi-
tive framing which may induce subjects to contribute more. In the
other case, we move the Nash outcome away from the status quo
towards taking by introducing a slight payoff asymmetry. Here the
Nash choice may be read as aggression by subjects using the status
quo as a reference point and induce destructive behavior.
Our main questions are: (1) does the FPG game generate de-
structive behavior and even cases where behavior equilibrates
towards sour relationships? (2) Howdoes separating the Nash out-
come from the status quo through framing or someminimal payoff
asymmetrymodulate taking and contributing? After the designwe
present our results, followed by a summary of our findings.
2. Experiment
Subjects played the FPG game in fixed dyads over 35 rounds in
all three treatments.
2.1. Symmetric treatment (SYM)
In each round both subjects of a dyad are endowed with a pri-
vate account holding 7 tokens, earning 10 units each, and a com-
mon account holding 14 tokens, earning 10 each for both subjects.
Subjects can contribute to or take up to 7 tokens from the common
account, at increasing marginal costs: moving one token costs 2
units, while the marginal transfer cost of each additional token in-
creases by 2.1 Earnings are symmetric around the status quowhich
coincides with the selfish Nash outcome, while any combination of
contributions of 4 or 5 is socially optimal.
2.2. Framing treatment (FRAME)
In FRAME subjects have exactly the same strategy space and
equivalent earnings, but now they start each round with 14 tokens
in their private accounts and the common account is empty. Thus,
to reach an outcome equivalent to an outcome in SYM, subjects
would have to contribute 7more tokens than before.2 Because only
contributions can be made, this is a case of positive framing.
2.3. Asymmetric treatment (ASYM)
ASYM differs from SYM in only two respects: tokens in the
private account earn subjects 11 units instead of 10, and the first
1 Formally, we use the following payoff function, where ci can be positive or
negative: VA(cA, cB) = 10(14 + cA + cB) + 10(7 − cA) − (|cA| + c2A). See Fig. 5
in the Appendix.
2 Payoff function: VA(cA, cB) = 10(cA+ cB)+10(14− cA)− (|cA−7|+ (cA−7)2).token transferred in either direction has zero costs. As in FRAME,
the Nash equilibrium does not coincide with the status quo, but
now it is the former thatmoves byprescribing to take one tokenout
of the common account, while both subjects contributing 5 tokens
is the social optimum.3
Subjects did not see the underlying formulas, butwere supplied
with graphs illustrating the marginal effects of every decision for
themselves and the other, alongside with payoff tables.4
The public good game was preceded by a test of social value
orientation (SVO; see Liebrand and McClintock, 1988, taken from
VanDijk et al., 2002). This testmeasures the preferences of subjects
for distribution outcomes for themselves and a (generalized) other.
Sessionswere run inNovember andDecember 2012 andApril 2013
at the CREED-lab in Amsterdam. SYM had 130 participants (50%
female, 2% unreported gender, average age 22.2), FRAME 54 (41%
female, average age 21.5), and ASYM 80 (43% female, average age
21.5). The experiment had an additional second part, which we do
not cover in this paper. The exchange rate of units into euros was
700 to one. Subjects earned on average 1.45 euro in the SVO-test
and 10.82 euro in the public good game.
3. Results
Table 1 gives an overview of average contributions, where we
adjust for the Nash equilibrium (NE) in each game by subtracting
7 tokens from results in FRAME and adding 1 to results in ASYM.
Average contributions are approximately 2 tokens above the
Nash-prediction in all treatments. The first round, however, reveals
a different pattern as the average contribution in FRAME is signif-
icantly lower than in SYM (p = 0.001).5 Because SYM and ASYM
are more similar to a taking game than FRAME (where only contri-
butions are possible), this result contrasts with the general finding
that there are typically lower contributions in taking framings, if
there is any difference (Andreoni, 1995; Sonnemans et al., 1998;
Goerg and Walkowitz, 2010). Khadjavi and Lange (2013) have a
treatment with intermediate endowments similar to our SYM and
ASYM treatments and find no differences between a contributing
frame and this alternative.
Subjects appear to be reluctant to contribute early on in FRAME,
but are able to compensate for this throughout the game, as the dif-
ference stays significant at 1% up until the fifth round of the game.
All treatments showan increase in contributions over time until
the (usually observed) sharp decline at the end; see Fig. 1.6 A
simple regression shows significant positive time trends. Although
the increase is at odds with the general observation of decreasing
cooperation in public good experiments (Ledyard, 1995), it has
been observed before in repeated two-player games using a
comparablemechanism (VanDijk et al., 2002). Comparing SYMand
ASYM, the hypothesis of equal contributions is rejected if they are
calculated relative to the status quo (p = 0.035), but not relative to
the Nash equilibrium outcome, which may suggest that the latter
is a more important reference point.
Most relevant to this paper is the occurrence and development
of destructive behavior hurting both partners. Relative to all deci-
sions, destructive decisions count 11% in SYM, 7% in FRAME, and
21% in ASYM; see Table 2. The percentages of subjects choosing
below the Nash at least once are, respectively, 42%, 46%, and 56%.
The higher number of destructive decisions in ASYM, despite sim-
ilar average contribution levels relative to the Nash outcome (see
3 Payoff function: VA(cA, cB) = 10(14+ cA + cB)+ 11(7− cA)+ |cA| − c2A .
4 Instructions are available upon request.
5 We use the Mann–Whitney U-test with dyad averages as observations unless
otherwise mentioned.
6 Contributions in the last round are lower than in the ten rounds before (p <
0.01 in all treatments).
M. Hoyer et al. / Economics Letters 123 (2014) 295–299 297Fig. 1. Average contributions, relative to Nash equilibrium.
Fig. 2. Between-subject variance across treatments/rounds.
Table 2
Percentage of destructive decisions.
SYM FRAME ASYM
Overall 11.25% 6.93% 21.14%
Last round 13.9% 5.36% 25%
Table 1), suggests distributional differences. Indeed, the variance
of subjects’ decisions is larger in ASYM than in SYM and FRAME in
31 of the 35 rounds (Levene’s test, p < 0.01; see also Fig. 2). In-
terestingly, this difference only becomes significant from the third
round onwards, which indicates that it is partly driven by the dy-
namics in the game. Not only the variance across subjects, but also
the variance within each subject’s set of 35 decisions is greater in
ASYM.7 Summing the destructive decisions of each dyad we find a
difference only between SYM and ASYM (p = 0.094).8 The higher
level of conflict observed in ASYM is confirmed by the observation
that the percentage of destructive decisions in the last round (when
there are no strategic considerations present) is higher in ASYM
than in the other treatments.
Backgroundmeasures seem to play a role in explaining destruc-
tive behavior: In ASYM and SYM contributions are lower and de-
struction rates higher in female dyads than in male dyads at 5%
significance levels and SVO correlates with individual decisions.9
7 Means of within-subject variances: 2.57 in SYM, 2.54 in FRAME, and 4.59 in
ASYM. The differences between SYM and ASYM (p < 0.001) and FRAME vs ASYM
(p = 0.038) are significant.
8 In linewith a result of Nikiforakis et al. (2012), who find higher rates of counter-
punishment in a treatment with increased normative conflict.
9 In ASYMwith p ≤ 1% for contributions in the first round, first 5 rounds, and the
whole game, and (negatively) with the number of destructive decisions; p ≤ 5% forTable 3
Probabilities of continuing a feud.










Number of distinct dyads with at least one feud of a certain length.
Feud length SYM FRAME ASYM Total
Feuds of any length 16 (52) 4 (6) 18 (57) 38 (115)
Length= 1 14 (29) 3 (5) 16 (30) 33 (64)
Length= 2 9 (13) 0 (0) 7 (12) 16 (25)
Note: first number reflects distinct dyads that are involved in feuds. Overall number
of feuds in parentheses.
It appears that sour relationships do indeed develop in the FPG
game, as illustrated in two examples in Fig. 3.
The most restrictive definition of a sour relationship is to only
consider instances of mutual destruction by both members of a
dyad at the same time. Fig. 4 shows these instances and separates
them by the number of rounds that they survive, linking up with
the feud-literature (Nikiforakis and Engelmann, 2011; Nikiforakis
et al., 2012). A majority of such relationships only survives for one
period, but a total of 51 develops past the first round. Since the
experiment ended after 35 rounds we report the cases in which
conflict is cut off at the end separately. Table 3 further shows the
probability with which mutual destructiveness proceeds after dif-
ferent numbers of rounds, now denoted as feuds. We see that the
cases which survive past the first round have increasing probabil-
ities of proceeding further. Table 4 reports the number of distinct
dyads that face at least one feud. We also ran a regression of the
probability of mutual punishment in the aggregate data using a
dyad-level logit model with random effects and using dummies in-
dicating a past series of exactly one, two, or three – but not more –
and four or more consecutive cases of mutual destruction in each
dyad, together with two similar variables for only one subject be-
ing destructive as explanatory variables. All these coefficients are
highly significant, those for bothhaving beendestructive are bigger
than those for only one having been destructive, and they increase
in size from two consecutive rounds onwards.10
4. Conclusion
This study shows that substantial destructive behavior can oc-
cur even in a public good environment once the opportunity to do
so is present. Our baseline Fragile PublicGoodgame–offering play-
ers equal room to take from or contribute to a public good, against
symmetric marginal costs – showed more than 10% destructive
decisions. While, unexpectedly, positive framing had significant
negative effects on contributing in the early rounds of the game,
players compensated for that later on, such that on average fewer
the first round in SYM; p ≤ 5% for the first 5 rounds and average contribution in
FRAMING, and p ≤ 10% for the first round and the overall number of destructive
decisions.
10 Coefficients between 4.4 and 6.9 (s.e. between 0.47 and 0.65). This specification
is problematic due to the dynamic nature of the regressors, which we try to tackle
by using variables that are unique within a feud. Alternative approaches, including
a subject-level based random effects model with additional explanatory variables
and with subjects nested in dyads as random effects produced qualitatively similar
results in that longer running periods of mutual destruction generally led to higher
increases in the probability of feud progression.
298 M. Hoyer et al. / Economics Letters 123 (2014) 295–299Fig. 3. Examples of sour relationships in SYM.Fig. 4. Distribution of feuds that end before (left bar) and at (right bar) the final round.destructive decisionswere observed. Introducing a slight asymme-
try by separating the Nash outcome from the initial status quo to-
wards taking one token sharply increased the share of destructive
decisions to more than 20% (even in the last round). Finally, we
show that feuds can occur in a setting without separate punish-
ment and it becomes increasingly difficult to exit them as they last
longer.
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Appendix
See Fig. 5.Fig. 5. Earnings of player 1, SYM.
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